## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, April 12, 1999

The House met at 12:30 p.m. and was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. PEASE).

# $\begin{array}{c} {\tt DESIGNATION~OF~SPEAKER~PRO} \\ {\tt TEMPORE} \end{array}$

The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following communication from the Speaker:

Washington, DC,  $April\ 12,\ 1999.$ 

I hereby appoint the Honorable EDWARD A. PEASE to act as Speaker pro tempore on this day.

J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Lundregan, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 98. An act to amend chapter 443 of title 49, United States Code, to extend the aviation war risk insurance program and to amend the Centennial of Flight Commemoration Act to make technical and other corrections.

H.R. 440. An act to make technical corrections to the Microloan Program.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 243. An act to authorize the construction of the Perkins County Rural Water System and authorize financial assistance to the Perkins County Rural Water System, Inc., a nonprofit corporation, in the planning and construction of the water supply system, and for other purposes.

S. 278. An act to direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands to the county of Rio Arriba, New Mexico.

S. 291. An act to convey certain real property within the Carlsbad Project in New Mexico to the Carlsbad Irrigation District.

S. 292. An act to preserve the cultural resources of the Route 66 corridor and to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to provide assistance

S. 293. An act to direct the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to convey certain lands in San Juan County, New Mexico, to San Juan College.

S. 334. An act to amend the Federal Power Act to remove the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to license projects on fresh waters in the State of Hawaii.

S. 356. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain works, facilities, and titles of the Gila Project, and designated lands within or adjacent to the Gila Project, to the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation and Drainage District, and for other purposes.

S. 382. An act to establish the Minuteman Missile National Historic Site in the State of South Dakota, and for other purposes.

S. 388. An act to authorize the establishment of a disaster mitigation pilot program in the Small Business Administration.

S. 422. An act to provide for Alaska state jurisdiction over small hydroelectric projects.

S. 756. An act to provide adversely affected crop producers with additional time to make fully informed risk management decisions for the 1999 crop year.

#### MORNING HOUR DEBATES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the order of the House of January 19, 1999, the Chair will now recognize Members from lists submitted by the majority and minority leaders for morning hour debate. The Chair will alternate recognition between the parties, with each party limited to 30 minutes, and each Member, except the majority leader, the minority leader, or the minority whip, limited to 5 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. STEARNS) for 5 minutes.

### MISADVENTURE IN YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. STEARNS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak about the ongoing military action against Yugoslavia and the reservations that many of us have concerning U.S. involvement.

Go back with me for a moment to Carl von Clausewitz, who probably has been quoted as the foremost military strategist in modern history, his writings were published posthumously on military strategy in 1832, one year after death, in a book entitled "On War." One of the key principles advanced by him that I think has relevance today, even though it was written in 1832, was in regard to military action, what is the political objective and, more importantly, in regard to military action against Yugoslavia because he indicated that political objective is a prime organizer for war. He writes, quote:

The political objective, the original motive for the war, will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.

What he was saying is that once you state what your political objective is to be, you then tailor your military strategy in order to achieve victory according to the original political objective, and this is the heart of my difficulties with our current military operation.

The President has propagated evershifting political objectives. By my own calculations, he has had at least three different stated political objectives in Kosovo.

The first stated objective by the administration was to prevent the ethnic cleansing of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo by the Yugoslavian Serbs. So what was the military strategy created to achieve a victory by President Clinton? They decided we would bomb the Serbs in order to prevent the wiping out of the Kosovars.

Mr. Speaker, the result has been failure. The administration's plans set the table for failure, and it resulted in the removal of at least 500,000 Kosovars from their homes and the killing of countless men and women and children. The sad fact is that intelligence sources have leaked that they warned the President and the administration beforehand that the likely result of bombing would be to trigger the Serbian assault on the Kosovars.

So, did the President and his advisers take into account the advice of our intelligence services and create a strategy to achieve victory according to his first objective? No. They ignored their advice and began the bombing which resulted in the misery that has enveloped the Kosovars.

Now the second objective, Mr. Speaker, was then to reduce the Serbs' warmaking ability. Again, the strategy was to continue bombing. Well, the results have been mixed. The United States Air Force has successfully punished Serbian forces, destroyed the infrastructure assets, and attacked political objectives such as a foreign ministry building in Belgrade. The bombing has yet, however, to weaken the hold on the power of Milosevic, and it is difficult to tell at this point how much maximum damage has been done to the Serbian Army. They still fully occupy the Kosovar province.

Now the third objective was to repatriate the Kosovars back to their homes. The military strategy to achieve this objective apparently is to continue bombing. Many of us wonder whether bombing will accomplish this last objective.

So the results are still to be determined, and to my knowledge the U.S. Government has not even begun negotiations with the Yugoslav Government to bring about the return of the Kosovars, end the bombing, and create some sort of political solution to give the Kosovars a limited autonomous state.